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leadership and helping us cross this hurdle now which must be crossed if
we are going to reach our full potential?
III.

FORMS OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE NORTH AMERICAN

FREE TRADE AGREEMENT

Michael Wallace Gordon*
What are the dispute resolution procedures and why were they formed?
Chapter 19 of NAFTA deals with dumping and subsidies
(Handled inside NAFTA)
Chapter 11 of NAFTA addresses investment disputes
(Handled mostly outside NAFTA)
Chapter 14 covers resolution of financial disputes (If noninvestment, moves into a Chapter 20 framework with
possibility of Chapter 14 characteristics, using panelists with
financial experience. If an investment financial issue, it goes
outside the Chapter 11 process)
Chapter 20 of NAFTA deals with all other disputes (Handled
inside NAFTA)
All of these dispute processes, except the investment procedure, are
processes where the government is challenging another government,
referred to in the NAFTA as a Party. In the case of dumping under Chapter
19, it might be the U.S. government that has stepped in on behalf of the
U.S. industry. In the case of Chapter 20, it is also the government that has
stepped in, challenging the action of another government. The same is true
in the financial dispute area, unless the dispute involves a financial
investment.
Contrastingly, Chapter 11, which deals with investment, allows a
private individual to bring an action against another government. Chapter
11 is proving to be a very serious problem within the framework of
NAFTA.
Why were these dispute resolution procedures created? There is a fairly
easy answer. If we did not create some kind of internationalresolution to
these trade disputes, they would be dealt with by national courts. For
example, if the dispute involved questions of dumping or subsidies, or other
interpretations of a Party's trade law, national domestic courts would have
to resolve the dispute. That might not be perceived as satisfactory to the
foreign parties. Even though the domestic courts may function very well,
there is often a perception of national favoritism. The NAFTA's dispute
* Chesterfield Smith Professor of Law at the University of Florida Levin College of Law
since 1968.
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resolution procedures attempts to eliminate this problem, while creating
processes that will be at least as efficient and competent as the national
courts.
Consider each NAFTA dispute resolution process in that context. First,
Chapter 19, which deals with dumping and subsidies. Assume the
government of Mexico is alleged to subsidize the cement industry, and the
industry itself is alleged to be dumping cement (selling it for less in the U.S.
than in Mexico). If the alleged subsidy is intended to allow Mexico to
export more, it would very likely be considered an illegal subsidy under
United States trade law. United States trade law and Mexican trade law
include dumping and subsidy provisions which essentially mirror, the
language in the GATT/WTO agreements, and, of course, the NAFTA
agreement as well.
The existence of dumping or subsidies, upon complaint usually from an
affected industry, begins a process of a government determination as to
whether or not dumping or subsidies exist. Furthermore, there must be a
determination of material injury. That determination is not made in a
binational panel. It is made by an administrative agency, in Mexico by
SECOFI and in the United States by the ITA and the ITC. The ITA
determines the existence or dumping or subsidies. The ITC determines
whether or not there is materialinjury to the industry. The appeal from the
administrative agency decision, would go, in the United States, to the Court
of International Trade (CIT). In Mexico, it would go to the federal court
in the federal district. Although these courts function quite adequately I believe the CIT performs very competently - there may be a perception
by the Mexican cement industry, and Mexican government, of nationalism.
An appeal from the CIT would go to the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit (CAFC), which is a federal circuit parallel court, just as the CIT is
the same level as a federal district court.
The Parties to NAFTA thought that there ought to be some way to
resolve disputes on a binational or multinational basis. Both Chapter 19 and
Chapter 20 of NAFTA dispute resolution have origins in the CanadaUnited States Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA). That Agreement had a
half-decade of existence before NAFTA. The CUSFTA established a
binational panel system, which was largely adopted in NAFTA. It was
adopted, I believe, because of the success of the CUSFTA. CUSFTA
Chapter 18 and Chapter 19 (predecessors to NAFTA Chapters 20 and 19,
respectively), handled perhaps thirty to forty cases. Most are generally
thought to have been resolved properly. There were only three appeals to
Extraordinary Challenge Committees (ECC). The ECC appeal is unique
and very limited. The binational panel determines whether or not the
government administrative agency performed its job correctly, in terms of
whether it applied its own law correctly. The appeal to the ECC is not a
second look at the agency determination, but a very narrow appeal that
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol13/iss1/3
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deals with rather exceptional circumstances, such as that a member of the
panel was guilty of gross negligence, gross misconduct, bias, or a serious
conflict of interest, or otherwise materially violated the rules of conduct; or
the panel seriously departed from a fundamental rule of procedure; or the
panel manifestly exceeded its powers, and those actions materially affected
the panel's decision and threatened the integrity of the binational panel
review process. Thus, an appeal to an Extraordinary Challenge Committee
is a serious challenge. Under the CUSFTA only three cases went to an
ECC. Under the NAFTA, only one Extraordinary Challenge Committee
request has been made, in the very contentious cement case.
The use of this form in Chapter 19 is interesting in that it deals with an
area (dumping and subsidies) that ultimately will probably be abolished.
One of the questions regarding the future of Chapter 19, as we move
towards the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas, is whether
dumping and subsidy challenges should be allowed. The European Union
does not permit one country to challenge another for subsidies or dumping.
If there is a trade issue that appears to involve unfair trade, it is brought
under the antitrust provisions of the Rome Treaty.
Before proceeding to Chapter 20, I ought to offer a disclaimer on
Chapter 19. Currently Professor Pereznieto Castro and I are sitting on a
Chapter 19 panel. He was initially appointed to the roster by Mexico, as I
was by the United States. The appointment of the panel is made on a
consensus basis, so he had the additional approval of the United States and
I had the additional approval of Mexico. We will address further the
appointment process, because it is one of the serious faults of the NAFTA
alternative dispute resolution process.
The second form of dispute resolution is Chapter 20. Chapter 20 is
much less specialized than Chapter 19. It essentially covers all
interpretations of NAFTA except for those in Chapter 19 (subsidies and
dumping), and Chapter 11 (investment). Chapter 20 may address issues
which are similar to dumping and subsidies in that they review an agency
determination. For example, one of the few cases decided to date under
NAFTA on Chapter 20 is called the Broom Corn Brooms case. It is a
safeguard or escape clause case. It dealt with brooms made of broom corn
entering the United States from Mexico in such increasing numbers that the
industry in the United States was allegedly seriously injured. Serious injury
is more than materialinjury, the standard for dumping and subsidies. One
might expect safeguard actions to be brought under Chapter 19, because
they involve agency determinations similar to those in Chapter 19.
Chapter 20 goes much beyond the highly technical area of safeguards
to include disputes in such areas as the two cases that are currently in
process. They involve whether or not the United States has violated its
NAFTA commitments by failing to open the borders to Mexican buses and
trucks. One of the panels has been established, the other may have been
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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completed recently. Unlike the Chapter 19 panels, the composition of
Chapter 20 panels is not announced. But a friend in Mexico City told me
in March, "You know, I'm on the truck panel, under Chapter 20." I said,
"You're not supposed to tell me that." But what tends to happen is that the
panel composition appears in the paper the day after it is appointed. There
have been some very substantial leaks.
Chapter 20 has been the subject of very few cases so far. It has
presumably worked well. But it has not been fully tested. I think as we
move from Chapter 19 to Chapters 20 and 11, we find experience and
success with Chapter 19, but discover less experience under Chapters 20
and 11. I believe that Chapter 20 has functioned well in the two cases
decided, the above mentioned Broom Com Brooms decision, and the
earlier decision involving an agricultural tariff issue. But it has not yet
addressed the kind of issues that will create very serious questions about
the viability of the NAFTA dispute resolution system. It has not yet dealt
with the U.S. Helms-Burton law, which involves trade with Cuba.
There has been a request by Mexico and Canada that the Helms-Burton
law, which has been very strongly condemned by most nations, including
an 11-0 vote in thejudicial committee of the OAS finding the law to violate
international law. The United States member, highly respected international
practitioner Keith Highet, cast his vote with the unanimous group.
Helms-Burton in NAFTA is on hold, mainly because the Europeans also
challenged the Helms-Burton law in the WTO, under that panel process,
and the Canadians and the Mexicans thought it would be better for the
success of NAFTA, if they were to defer pressing the case. About four
years ago, I moderated a panel in Mexico City that also included the
ambassadors to Cuba from Mexico and Canada, and the U.S. advisor to
President Clinton on Cuba. I asked the Mexican and Canadian ambassadors
privately whether their nations were considering challenging the Cuban
Democracy Act, which at that time was quite new. One of them said, with
the other concurring, "That's absolutely hands-off. We do not want to
bring Cuba into the NAFTA and make any challenges dealing with Cuba
through the NAFTA." The passage of time and especially the enactment of
Helms-Burton in 1996 brought about a significant change in that view,
since both Mexico and Canada have said that the adoption of the HelmsBurton law has taken the issue a step beyond where they did not want to
get involved. I do not believe we yet know what will be the limits of
Chapter 20.
Chapter 11 is the most difficult dispute resolution section, because it
allows individual investors to sue a foreign government, without permission
of the individual's own government to go forward. In Chapter 19 and
Chapter 20 cases, the government brings the action. It may do so
representing an allegedly injured industry, as in the Broom Corn Brooms
case, or on it is own, as in the Helms-Burton challenge. Chapter 19 and 20
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol13/iss1/3
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are government-to-government. But in a Chapter 11 investment dispute, it
is an individual investor versus the foreign government. There have been
about ten Chapter 11 cases filed. It may be a fair observation that few if any
were the type of cases contemplated by the drafters as Chapter 11.
Contemplated in the sense that none of them were cases which were
discussed as potential Chapter 11 cases. They fall into two categories. The
first are cases dealing with environmental issues. Although there is an
environmental side agreement, with its own dispute resolution process, the
first series of cases that were brought under Chapter 11 were environmental
cases.
For example, the Metalclad Corporation of the United States, through
its Mexican subsidiary, Quimica Omega, received a permit from the
Mexican government to construct and operate a hazardous waste landfill
in San Luis Potosi, Mexico. Metalclad undertook an expensive cleanup.
But the company was prohibited by the State government from opening the
landfill. The State governor stated that the site was part of a 600,000-acre
ecological zone. State police physically blocked access to the facility. The
company withdrew its investment, and filed a $65 million claim against the
Mexican government for expropriation of its property.
Chapter 11 may have made the meaning of expropriation very elastic.
The meaning of expropriation seems to be extending into regulatory
processes more than one might have thought it would. Had these cases
been predicted during the negotiations, Chapter 11 might look very
different. But there is a more serious problem with Chapter 11. It is
exemplified by a fairly recent case that was filed that has been in the news.
It is the Chapter 11 case initiated by the Canadian funeral home Loewen
Group, Inc. The company opened up funeral homes in various areas of the
United States including Mississippi. A private Mississippi funeral home
owner believed Loewens was competing unfairly, and initiated suit. He
indicated that he would be happy to "sell-out" for a million dollars or so,
but the Loewens company was disinterested. They are kind of a
"McDonald's" of the funeral industry, if you will. Loewens was sued in a
state court in Mississippi. Negative connotations were made regarding
Loewens being Canadian, and that the company would not bury minorities.
There was a mixed-race jury. The end result was a verdict of $500 million
($400 million punitive). The funeral home owner was obviously pleased,
and stated that he would have been pleased to sell out earlier for about a
million. In order to appeal, the Canadian company was required under
Mississippi law to post a cash bond of 125% of the value of thejudgement.
They said they did not have it. They settled for $150-175 million, and soon
thereafter brought the Chapter 11 action. It is Loewens v. UnitedStates not
Loewens v. Mississippi.It seems that the U.S. government does not have
adequate control over its state judicial systems, and in this case the judicial
system in Mississippi had run amock. The Mississippi legal system has
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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characteristics not used in Canada, such punitive damages, very high bond
appeal requirements, civil juries, etc. Should Loewens have had to face
these alien legal characteristics? It is not at all clear how the case will come
out. The U.S. is currently contesting jurisdiction.
How should we view the NAFTA dispute process to date? First,
Chapter 19. I would divide Chapter 19 into two areas. I would grade (as
a law faculty member, I am programmed to give grades) the quality of the
decisions of Chapter 19 a "B" or "B+". The decisions have generally been
well received. But the problem is that those decisions have come about far
later than they ought to under the time framework. The convening of
Chapter 19 panels has taken far more time than it should. Professor
Pereznieto Castro and I are on a panel that was initially requested on
August 17th, 1998. We received the initial notice from the Secretariats on
August 27th, a few days later, stating that we were being considered for
membership on the panel. Everyone on each nation's roster received a
similar letter. We both replied, stating that we did not believe we had
conflicts and were available. The panel should have been formed by
October 13th, 1998. We were appointed to this panel on December 2nd of
1999, fourteen months late. That is not all of the problem, and as Steve
Powell can tell you so well, the politics of the selection of the initial five
people on the panel is quite an interesting story in itself. After the group of
five is selected they receive the briefs and other papers, with some
confidential information removed. The papers in our case filled a large
carton. Reading these papers may tell you that you indeed have a conflict.
For an academic, that is very unlikely. But for a practitioner in Washington,
two of whom were selected for our panel, a conflict may be disclosed. One
of our panelists discovered that there was a conflict within his law firm. The
same thing happened with the other Mexican panelist. Thus, those two
panelists had to withdraw. We have not yet had two other panelists
selected. We are back into that political process of trying to get a consensus
to get two more panelists. The panel selection process deserves an "F" for
its undue delay. But, I would give the quality of the panels a pretty solid
44B+".
For Chapter 20 panels, the quality of the two decisions seems to merit
the same high grades as for the Chapter 19 decisions. But, I am concerned
that the tough cases have not yet come before Chapter 20. If the HelmsBurton case is revived, under either the WTO or the NAFTA, the United
States has argued that it will use the national security defense. That means
it will claim that Cuba poses a national security threat to the U.S. The
quality ofthe Chapter 20 panels also deserves high grades, but like Chapter
19, the appointment process has been very slow. There has not even been
a Chapter 20 roster appointed by the U.S. The panels have been made up
as the cases arise.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol13/iss1/3
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Chapter 11 deserves an "Incomplete." We have not really seen where
it is going, but it does not seem to be going in the direction that people
thought it was going. It has been used to challenge regulatory
environmental processes, and it has been used to challenge the fundamental
nature of legal systems, neither of which was an appropriate or intended use
of Chapter 11. Another difficulty with measuring Chapter 11 is that the
cases do not have to be reported. As in the case of many arbitration
proceedings, the parties may decide to keep the cases secret. But not when
the United States government is a party. In such case, as in Loewen, the
Freedom of Information Act forces disclosure.
Let me end with a comment about a call from an attorney with a U.S.
office in the executive branch soon after the Loewens case was filed. The
lawyer said, "Could you think oftwo Chapter 11 investment hypotheticals,
one that would really irritate the Canadians and another that would really
irritate the Mexicans?" I said, "I could think up something about a funeral
home" and the attorney said "No,no, no. No funeral homes." I did think up
one that would challenge the whole system of amparo in Mexico, a very
fundamental constitutional process, and a second that challenged the whole
system of timber and forestry in Canada. Chapter 11 is on hold. The
Canadians have said very clearly that they will not permit a Chapter 11
parallel to appear in the Free Trade Area of the Americas, if it allows an
individual to challenge a government.
One of our difficulties is that we really cannot measure these alternative
dispute resolution procedures only from the perspective of NAFTA. We
must be thinking of them as suitable or unsuitable for the proposed FTAA.
Dispute resolution is one of the FTAA working groups. The framework of
the NAFTA system is certainly a framework that we might use in the
FTAA, just as we used the framework of the Canada-United States Free
Trade Agreement for the NAFTA. But Chapter 11 has no roots in the
CUSFTA. It is a creation of the NAFTA, and it may be unfit for further
application.
Let me leave you with a thought that the past decade has witnessed
United States thinking North-South seriously for the first time in its history,
not to scold but to negotiate. NAFTA is important because it tells us
whether or not we can get along with our closest neighbors in free trade.
If we cannot get along with Mexico and with Canada, how can we possibly
get along with countries further to the South?
NAFTA is an experience that must be successful. Considering the
alternative dispute resolution system thus far, for the most part it receives
passing grades, and in some cases very fine grades. The problems with
Chapters 19 and 20 are mainly the delays in panel selection, not the quality
of the decisions. This is correctable by using the language of the NAFTA
and selecting panels without consensus. The problems with Chapter 11 are
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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far more substantive and require changes to the language. That will be more
difficult.
Michael W. Gordon
PANEL DISCUSSION

I am always a little concerned about speaking on elevated platforms.
One of the first moderations of a panel that I did was in 1974, in
Washington D.C., where we had an elevated platform at the annual meeting
of the American Society of International Law. On my left was the American
Attorney General, and on my right was the Mexican Attorney General, and
we had the legal counsel from the ACLU. We were talking about the drug
issue between the two countries. Just before the panel started - there were
two or three hundred people present - I was standing at the very edge of
the platform, talking to someone on the platform, and someone tapped me
on the back. I turned around and fell off the platform. I thought I ought to
say something when I got up to begin the program, and I said "I really
shouldn't feel so bad, this is, after all, April of 1974 - the height of
Watergate issues. There are an awful lot of people in this city who have
fallen much further recently." I did not realize that on my left, the Attorney
General for the U.S., Richard Kleindienst, had been indicted that morning.
So I will be careful what I say.
Perhaps the secular institutions which we most revere in the United
States are the courts. It is a legacy from our English common law.
Reverence for the courts is diminished or absent in many nations. Many
civil law nations continue to struggle to restore the respect for the
institutions and persons of the law, which was a troubling consequence of
the French Revolution.
In our quest for a peaceful life under the rule of law, in both common
law-and civil law-tradition nations, we speak ofjudicial independence as a
pre-condition to fulfilling this quest. If the public perception is thatjudicial
independence does not exist, the courts become useless as impartial arbiters
of disputes. As a famous English Lord Justice remarked, "It is better for
justice to be seen to be done than to be done." Whether it is politics,
corruption, or incompetence that affects our courts, disputants will seek out
alternative forms of resolution.
Even ifjudicial independence is generally perceived as a characteristic
of a specific legal system, and I like to think it is a characteristic of ours,
another reason for rejecting the courts may exist. It is that they were
created and have functioned almost exclusively as nationalcourts. It may
be easier to establish the perception ofjudicial independence than ofjudicial
impartiality, when one of the disputants is from a foreign nation. If the
perception endures that national courts favor nationals, or national
interests, disputants will seek alternative forums.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol13/iss1/3
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Thus, even if the courts of the United States are characterized as
fulfilling the goal of judicial independence, they are clearly not
characterized from abroad, and indeed, from minority groups within, as
being judicially impartial.
Our panel is going to explore the use of very different alternatives to
resolve very different breakdowns in the functioning of national courts. Let
me introduce the panelists:
In my thirty-four years of teaching, thirty-two years here, a principle
interest has been the rule of law in the United States and Latin America. As
a more practical matter, in Latin American nations within a two-hour flight
from Florida. One's focus must have practical limitations. It is cheaper, and
thus more likely to be funded by one's institution, to fly to Costa Rica than
to Buenos Aires. One might even drive, as my wife and two children and
I have done, in Volkswagens, to Mexico and beyond to Guatemala or
Costa Rica on eight different occasions in the 1970's and 1980's. That
might help you understand why our panel is here from Guatemala and
Mexico.
In 1977, as a Fulbright Professor in Guatemala, I met Maria Luisa
Beltranena (de Padilla), on my immediate left. She taught in a summer
program we conducted in Guatemala. She was a rising star and would, in
the years to come, become the first woman Dean of a Guatemalan law
school, Rafael Landivar, with whom we conducted our program. She
would become the first woman to serve on the Guatemalan Supreme Court,
and the first woman to serve as President of the Supreme Court. She would
become the second woman to serve in the Cabinet - she served as
Minister of Education. She reached the height of success more recently
when she declined the Ambassadorship to Great Britain, because she
prefers her current work as a law professor at Francisco Marroquin
University, in Guatemala City. Professor Beltranena honored us two
months ago by coming as a visiting professor for three weeks.
We were supposed to have, on the far right, Professor Maritza
McCormack, who is on the law faculty of the University of Havana in
Cuba. I visited her university about a year-and-a-half ago, and talked with
the Dean of the Law School, who was involved in a very unique mediation
program. It is a program which uses mediation for family matters and real
estate issues in Havana, in order to avoid the political nature of the Cuban
courts. We thought this to be a quite remarkable program, and thought we
had the backing of our government. But unfortunately, Professor
McCormack remains in Havana because of the disinclination of our
government to permit her to leave the country. Curiously, her government
gave her permission to come here and talk about the political problems of
Cuban courts, and how mediation is a good alternative, but our government
did not think it was that good an idea.
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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In our quest to build our international law programs here at the UF, we
hired two exceptional scholars and practitioners this year. It is the first
time, as far as I can recall, that we have been so successful in my three
decades here in developing our international programs. One of them is
Steve Powell, who will be moderating the next panel on trade. The other
is to my right, Professor Berta Hernandez, who adds to our public
international law and human rights efforts a dimension previously lacking.
She has a remarkable scholarly record and a reputation unexcelled in her
work on issues facing women in Latin America.
On my far left, is Professor Leonel Pereznieto Castro, who is a
professor at several law schools in Mexico City, as well as in ITAM, the
technological institute, which is a highly-regarded institution. He is a
graduate of the Escuela Libre in Mexico, the institution with which we have
a formal exchange agreement. Three of our faculty have taught there in the
past year, three of their faculty have taught here. Professor Pereznieto has
been here before on programs. He is one of the most prolific authors in
Mexico. Indeed, he has two new books out this year on International
Private Law. He is the pre-eminent lawyer in Mexico dealing with private
international law issues. He recently stepped down from service as one of
the first Commissioners on the Comisi6n Competencia, the commission that
is responsible for antitrust and trade restraint issues. We are delighted to
have him here. He will speak on Mexican courts and arbitration.
I think the best way to proceed is to have Professor Beltranena talk first,
and Professor Pereznieto Castro second, because they will speak about
alternatives within a nation addressing issues of failures in their domestic
courts. After they have finished, Professor Hernandez and I will talk about
the use of alternatives where the issues are more international in nature. I
have asked our panelists to consider the following questions:
1. The basic characteristics of the alternatives that have been developed,
2. Why they have been developed rather than using traditional national
courts,
3. The experience to date, and
4. If they have prophecies as to how these institutions will evolve in the
future.
Let me start by asking Professor Beltranena to talk about the
Guatemalan Constitutional Court - a very unique structure.
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